To ensure data is not being compromised we strongly recommend, and in some cases require, drives to be encrypted

See Chemistry IT project:

See also

Mac Encryption

Windows Encryption

Disk-level and file-level encryption is somewhat supported at Cornell (and some in ChemIT have some familiarity with it)

To-do: Current offering is not as solid as emerging options appear to be for Windows. Once emerging options are solidifies operationally and support-wise, get CIT's:

  • Documentation.
  • Recommendation(s).
  • Central key-escrow details and process.
  • Clarify central support and expectations for either technical staff and end-users.

 

ChemIT's current capabilities

 

  • Consultation regarding encryption
    • Risk management, whether encryption or its alternatives, is as much an issue of ones behaviors and attitudes as it is about technology.
    • Note: We personally have very limited experience with encryption.
  • Benefits of encryption.
    • Use-cases when it's helpful. And when it's not helpful.
    • Encryption can represent unnecessary bother and risks in meeting some needs.
  • Alternatives to encryption.
    • If the data is not on your laptop (for example), there is no need to have encrypted data on the laptop.
    • Identifying benefits and risks of various alternatives.
  • Risks if using encryption. Currently, must self-escrow keys.
    • You may lose your data because of the encryption, through technical failures or losing keys.
    • Your backups may not be set up correctly relative to your encryption choices.
    • There is no university support for failed situations, including from ChemIT staff.
  • Very limited training via some show-and-tell related to encryption or alternatives.
    • We cannot provide on-going support for anyone choosing to use encryption.

Future direction

If and when Cornell provides central support for file-level or disk-level encryption, ChemIT can naturally expand its services as appropriate.

  • Coming as part of CU's MS Configuration Management service

Continue to gauge demand within CCB. Requests for the service are almost non-existant so far. We recognize that although CCB use-cases seem low, but perhaps some risks are well hidden. (Faculty do travel. What data do they take with them?)

  • Would those same, well-hidden use-cases avail themselves of an encryption service?

Possible, if deemed sufficiently valuable to CCB:

  • Advocate for a central encryption service.
  • Set up a service.
    • R&D, then testing promising solutions. Vetting can take a lot of time to uncover all the undocumented "gotchas". Develop recommendations, along with recommended alternatives.
    • Invest in, and bear the risks, associated with provisioning a local key escrow.
    • Invest in documentation and maintaining that documentation.
    • Provide in-person support for when things are going well. And for when things do not go well, when a higher technical competence is expected, often specialized.

 

 

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